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Objective. To investigate the effects ofMedicare’s Prospective Payment System (PPS)
for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and associated rate changes on quality of care as
represented by staffing ratios and regulatory deficiencies.
Data Sources. Online Survey, Certification andReporting (OSCAR) data from 1996–
2000 were linked with Area Resource File (ARF) and Medicare Cost Report data to
form a panel dataset.
Study Design. A difference-in-differences model was used to assess effects of the PPS
and the BBRA (Balanced Budget Refinement Act) on staffing and deficiencies, a design
that allows the separation of the effects of the policies from general trends. Ordinary
least squares and negative binomial models were used.
Data Collection Methods. The OSCAR and Medicare Cost Report data are self-
reported by nursing facilities; ARF data are publicly available. Data were linked by
provider ID and county.
Principal Findings. We find that professional staffing decreased and regulatory
deficiencies increasedwith PPS, and that both effects weremitigatedwith the BBRA rate
increases. The effects appear to increase with the percent of Medicare residents in the
facility except , in some cases, at the highest percentage of Medicare. The findings on
staffing are statistically significant. The effects on deficiencies, though exhibiting
consistent signs and magnitudes with the staffing results, are largely insignificant.
Conclusions. Medicare’s PPS system and associated rate cuts for SNFs have had a
negative effect on staffing and regulatory compliance. Further research is necessary to
determine whether these changes are associated with worse outcomes. Findings from
this investigation could help guide policy modifications that support the provision of
quality nursing home care.
Key Words. Nursing home quality, Medicare, prospective payment, staffing,
deficiencies
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) mandated the largest decrease in
payments for nursing home residents covered by Medicare since 1965. The
BBA fundamentally changed the way Medicare pays skilled nursing facilities
for the 9 percent of residents covered by Medicare. The new system——the
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Prospective Payment System (PPS)——which began in 1998, pays nursing
homes on a prospective basis instead of through a retrospective cost-based
system. Nursing homes are paid a fixed amount per day, with adjustments for
health status, but no extra payments for additional services are made. Like
with most prospective systems, the goals were to reduce the rapid growth in
spending while maintaining quality of care.
Total Medicare payments to skilled nursing facilities fell in the year after
prospective payment was introduced. Reports of financial difficulties began
appearing in the media, andmore than 10 percent of facilities nationwide filed
Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Roadman 2000), includingmany of the largest chains
(e.g., Vencor, Genesis Health Ventures, Mariner Post-Acute Network,
Integrated Health Services, Sun Healthcare Group). There are substantial
concerns that the change in payment system, combined with a reduction in
total payments, may have reduced the quality of care.
We examine the effects of PPS and subsequent rate changes on two
measures of nursing home quality of care. The first is a process-based
measure——staffing hours per resident-day. Although the evidence is mixed on
the exact nature of the relationship (Davis 1991; Zhang and Grabowski 2004),
staffing has been shown in some studies to have an effect on resident
outcomes, especially professional staffing (Centers forMedicare andMedicaid
Services 2001; Cohen and Spector 1996; Castle 2000; Harrington et al. 2000;
Johnson-Pawlson and Infeld 1996;Wunderlich andKohler 2000). The second
measure of quality is the number of regulatory deficiencies cited in Medicare
and Medicaid recertification surveys. Each certified nursing facility is surve-
yed by a state agency at least once every 15 months to check for compliance
with regulations on care practices and management. A nursing facility is cited
with a deficiency if surveyors find it out of compliance with any one of several
hundred individual requirements. These deficiencies are recorded in the
Online Survey, Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) database used in our
analysis. Deficiencies, like many other commonly used measures of quality,
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are imperfect proxies, but they do indicate changes in resident outcomes that
cannot be gleaned from analysis of staffing alone.
Our study focuses on how changes inMedicare payment affect quality of
care by comparing staffing and deficiencies in nursing homes before and after
the implementation of PPS. We allow for differences between different types
of nursing homes, and use a difference-in-differences design to separate the
effects of payment changes from concurrent trends in the industry.
Furthermore, in contrast to some other studies, we view the nursing facility
as a whole, with revenue streams from one type of resident potentially
affecting quality of care for all residents.
BACKGROUND
Between 1986 and 1998, skilled nursing facility (SNF) care became the fastest-
growing segment of Medicare expenditures, growing at an average of 30
percent per year nominally (U.S. General Accounting Office 1999). Facilities
were reimbursed under a retrospective cost-based system, with limits on
routine costs but no limits on ancillary services such as physical and
occupational therapy. Although the growth was due in part to a large increase
in the number of Medicare beneficiaries using SNF services (an 80 percent
increase between 1990 and 1997 alone according to the Prospective Payment
Assessment Commission [1997]), the system was widely seen as encouraging
excessive use of ancillary therapies while providing few incentives for cost
containment. In response, the BBAmandated the implementation of a PPS for
skilled nursing facilities.
Accordingly, the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA), now the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), began a phased-in
implementation of a per diem Medicare PPS for skilled nursing facilities in
July 1998. Retrospective, cost-based reimbursement was replaced with
prospective per diem rates for each Medicare resident. The case-mix
categories used for differential reimbursement are based on the 44 groups in
the Resource Utilization Group III (RUG-III) system (Fries et al. 1994). The
RUG-III system was developed using time studies of nursing and therapy
needs. The facility is responsible for providing appropriate care efficiently
(including choosing the appropriate staffing levels) and is not reimbursed for
costs incurred beyond the PPS rate.
The SNF PPS system was phased in over four years, with the start date
corresponding to each facility’s own fiscal year start date on or after July 1,
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1998. In the first year, facilities were paid based on 25 percent federal rate and
75 percent facility-specific rate. The federal proportion of the rate increased by
25 percentage points each year until the rate was 100 percent federal. Rates
were designed based on average costs per case-mix category in 1995; each
facility’s 1995 costs determined the facility-specific rate, and the average cost
over all facilities determined the federal rate, updated for inflation.
Adjustments are made for regional wage differences and rural status.
The PPS was not intended to be budget-neutral. A major goal of the
change to prospective rates was to slow the growth inMedicare SNF costs. The
PPS rates were set to decrease average payments for the majority of facilities,
with total savings in 1999 estimated ex-ante by theCongressional BudgetOffice
at $1.2 billion; instead, expenditures were cut by $3.4 billion in 1999,more than
double the intended amount (LewinGroup 2000). Concerns over the industry’s
financial viability led Congress to enact adjustments to the system in the
Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) of April 2000, slightly increasing the
federal rates in all RUG-III groups and by 20 percent in 15 of the groups where
rates were thought to be most problematic. The adjustments were seen as a
temporary solution, scheduled to end when an improved classification system
was developed. The BBRA also allowed facilities with lower facility-specific
rates to move to the full federal rate with the start of the next cost-reporting
period rather than following the four-year phase-in. Additional adjustments to
the system were enacted in the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of
2000 (BIPA), implemented in 2001. Provisions of BIPA are not considered in
our analysis due to data limitations. Parts of the BBRA and BIPA were allowed
to expire in 2002, but the adequacy of the rates remains controversial.
EVIDENCE FROM THE LITERATURE
The literature on the relationship between payment and quality in nursing
homes focuses mainly on the effect of Medicaid case-mix reimbursement and
the effect of Medicaid rate changes. Feder and Scanlon (1989) found that the
case-mix system implemented in Maryland resulted in no readily measurable
declines in quality. Likewise, Schlenker (1991) found no differences in
outcomes (catheter use, urinary tract infections, pressure ulcers, psychotropic
drugs, confusion, and physical restraints) in states with case-mix versus other
types of reimbursement systems. These studies were largely descriptive, using
simple before-and-after comparisons in one or several states. On the other
hand, Norton (1992) used aMarkov model to find that monetary incentives to
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providers in a Medicaid-based case-mix experiment had beneficial effects on
the quality of nursing home care. No general conclusions can be drawn from
these studies as to the effects of prospective case-mix reimbursement for
Medicaid residents on quality of care in nursing facilities.
Another segment of the literature on Medicaid reimbursement and
quality of care concerns the effect ofMedicaid rate increases in the presence of
excess demand (Scanlon 1980). In an excess demand framework, facilities
have a great deal of choice in which residents they choose to accept or reject;
Medicaid residents are accepted last, and Medicaid demand exceeds supply.
Under excess demand, some researchers have shown that higher Medicaid
rates can actually lead to lower quality (Nyman 1985; Gertler 1989).
Recent studies have established that currentmarket conditions no longer
support the excess demand framework in most areas. Occupancy rates have
been in steady decline since the mid-1990s (American Health Care
Association 2001), forcing facilities to compete for all types of residents.
Cohen and Spector (1996), using nationally representative data, found no
effect of Medicaid reimbursement on outcomes that would support the excess
demand theory. Grabowski (2001a) used national OSCAR data from 1995–
1996 to find that an increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates improved
quality as measured by professional staffing. In a similar study using other
measures of quality (Grabowski 2001b), rates were found to have a small but
statistically significant and positive effect on quality, again refuting the excess
demand results usingmore current data. Thus, much of the historical literature
on the effect of Medicaid payment changes on quality may no longer apply.
The literature described above on the effects of Medicaid payment
changes on quality leaves many gaps in the research as far as assessing the
potential effects of skilled nursing facility PPS.Many of the earlier studies used
limited methods and have limited generalizability because they used older
data from one or several states. In comparison, the newer studies refuting the
excess demand framework offer substantive and methodological insights as to
the potential effects ofMedicare reimbursement changes in nursing facilities in
a competitive market. In the context of this analysis they are limited, however,
by the focus on Medicaid. While Medicaid residents have generally been
considered the least desirable residents due to low rates, they comprise the
majority of residents, and Medicare residents have usually been considered a
highly desirable minority. Effects on quality across all residents may therefore
be very different for changes in payment for these two populations.
The research that directly addresses the effects of skilled nursing facility
PPS on quality of care is still quite limited. Hodlewsky and colleagues found
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trends in professional staffing and deficiencies consistent with negative effects
of PPS on quality, but the analysis was preliminary and did not control for
competing explanations (Hodlewsky et al. 2001). Angelelli and colleagues
used Medicare claims data to look at preliminary effects of PPS on
rehospitalization rates, a standard measure of quality for postacute patients,
and found no significant changes; the study used a simple pre–post design and
was limited to the effect on Medicare residents (Angelelli et al. 2002).
Similarly, McCall and colleagues used a pre–post design and claims data for
all types of Medicare postacute care patients and found no increases in
rehospitalization, emergency room visits, or mortality after the BBA was
implemented (McCall et al. 2003). Neither of the latter studies considered
potential effects on non-Medicare residents.
In sum, this study fills an important gap and adds to research in the field
in several ways: It assesses the behavior of nursing facilities facing changes in
Medicare reimbursement, which may differ significantly from behavior in
response to changes inMedicaid; it addresses the important and timely policy
question of whether the PPS and the BBRA affect quality of care in nursing
homes; it looks at the nursing facility as a whole and includes potential effects
on non-Medicare residents; and it uses a design and econometricmethods that




There are two reasons why nursing facilities would be expected to lower
quality of care after the implementation of PPS (Cutler 1995; Norton et al.
2002). First, the elimination of reimbursement beyond the flat payment gives
an incentive tominimize costs, which shouldmake facilities more efficient (the
intended effect), but it could also lead facilities to decrease quality in order to
minimize costs. This negative incentive may be balanced by the need to
compete with other providers and maintain reputation. Second, the average
payment received also changes, depending on how the facility’s previous
reimbursements compare to the new rates. Under SNF PPS, the funding cuts
led to a decrease in average payments for most facilities. The funding cut
results in a separate pathway by which quality may decrease, that of facilities
having fewer resources. Thus, quality is expected to decrease due to PPS and
increase again due to the BBRA rate increases.
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These incentives apply to both for-profit and nonprofit facilities,
although the majority of facilities are for-profit (Norton 2000). Our study
allows for the possibility that the magnitude of the effects may differ by
proprietary status. In nursing facilities, it is often assumed that nonprofit
facilities provide a higher level of quality than for-profit facilities, as found by
Chou (2002). Nonprofits must still be concerned with staying in operation,
however, and may behave similarly to for-profits if financial viability is at
stake. Although the directions of the incentives are the same for both types, in
our empirical work we allow the magnitude to differ by proprietary status.
Similarly, because chain facilities were potentially experiencing greater effects
as demonstrated by bankruptcy filings reported by the media, we allow the
magnitude to differ between chain and independent facilities. Finally,
hospital-based facilities may have been disproportionately affected by PPS,
because their costs were traditionally higher and PPS equalized rates between
hospital-based and freestanding facilities. Because the underlying incentives
remained the same, we analyzed hospital-based and freestanding facilities
together but, again, allowed for differing magnitudes of effects.
Study Design
We use a model that can separate the effects of PPS from macro-effects that
may be causing changes in the dependent variable over time. A difference-in-
differences design generally takes advantage of a natural experiment to
simulate the existence of treatment and control groups, thereby measuring
effects of a policy only over and above the trend in the control group. It
compares the difference over time for the treatment group compared to the
difference over time for the control group. The approach here depends on the
assumption that facilities with Medicare residents should experience the
effects of PPS, while facilities with no Medicare residents (20 percent of
facilities in the analysis) should not. Similarly, facilities with a higher
proportion of Medicare residents should experience a stronger effect from
PPS. Because the majority of residents in most facilities are Medicaid or
private-pay, most facilities will experience similar trends in quality associated
with Medicaid and other non-PPS causes——these are the pre–post differences.
Facilities with Medicare residents may experience an additional shock due to
the implementation of PPS, creating a difference in the trend between facilities
that have Medicare residents and facilities that do not. This differential trend
separates the effects of PPS from other factors.
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Our design accounts for industry-wide and national trends unrelated to
PPS, because wewould see those trends in the reference group as well as in the
Medicare facilities. For example, a general staffing shortage might lead to
decreased quality over time for the average facility regardless of PPS status. A
simple analysis of quality-of-care measures over time could not separate the
effect of the staffing shortage from the effect of PPS. The difference-in-
differences approach, however, takes into account the general staffing effect
within a state or region and attributes only the additional variation in the
dependent variable to the effect of PPS. Time-invariant state-to-state
differences are accounted for by the state fixed effects. However, time-varying
changes in individual state policy——such as cuts inMedicaid or rising costs due
to litigation in particular states during the study period——could be proble-
matic. With these types of changes, trends in the reference group become
more heterogeneous and the design less valid. Within a particular state,
however, the comparison to the reference group should still be valid. We
therefore tested for this problem by running the analysis on several of the
largest states individually and found that the effects did not change
substantially, except that significance levels declined slightly as sample size
declined. Thus, within-state changes over time appear not to be a problem.
Our design relies heavily on the use of the percent Medicare in the facility
to represent the extent to which a facility is exposed, or vulnerable to, potential
changes in Medicare policy. Certainly, the policy changes should affect those
facilities more that are more reliant on Medicare revenues. The percent of
residents in the facilitywhose care is paid for byMedicare is a good but imperfect
measure of that exposure. Other potential measures would be the percent of
revenues fromMedicare and the percent of beds certified byMedicare, but these
two measures are more problematic in practice: data on revenues from all
sources are not readily available at the facility level, and the percent of certified
beds has little correlation with reliance on Medicare. Many facilities simply
certify all beds for both Medicaid and Medicare, and some facilities with 100
percent Medicare-certified beds consistently have no or fewMedicare residents.
Our measure is therefore preferable but has two potential drawbacks: the
percent of Medicare residents a facility can attract depends not only on facility
capacity, but also onmarket forces; and facilitieswith the samepercentMedicare
may have different financial exposure to policy changes depending on case mix.
We control for the first by including time-varying measures of market
competition and demand; the second remains a limitation of the data.
The design is strengthened slightly by the staggered implementation
dates and the phase-in of PPS rates. The majority of facilities were subject to
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PPS rates beginning January 1, 1999, but an adequate number (approxi-
mately 23 percent) implemented PPS at other points between July 1, 1998, and
June 30, 1999. If facilities implementing PPS earlier experience changes in
quality earlier, the changes are more likely to be due to PPS than to general
trends. The effect of PPS should also become stronger as the phase-in moves
from the 25 percent federal rate toward the 100 percent federal rate,
controlling for the effect of the BBRA; thus the phase-in also helps to identify
effects specific to PPS.
Data and Measures
The primary data source for our analysis is CMS’s Online Survey, Certification
and Reporting Database (OSCAR) for 1996–2000, which provides ownership
type, staffing levels, fiscal year, resident census, payer mix, and deficiencies cited
during each standard recertification survey. OSCAR includes all facilities in the
nation that are certified for Medicare or Medicaid, thus excluding an
inconsequential percent of facilities that accept only private-pay residents. Of
65,801 observations in the original dataset, 140 observations were deleted
because theyweremissing the fiscal year starting date, a key variable determining
whether or not the facilitywas under the prospective payment systemat any point
in time. In addition, 5,378 observationswith data deemed to be erroneous for key
variables were excluded according to the criteria used by CMS in its report to
Congress on staffing (Centers forMedicare andMedicaid Services 2001). Criteria
for deletion of a survey were: facilities reporting more residents than beds;
facilities reporting no registered nurse (RN) hours and 60 or more beds; facilities
reporting more than 12 RN hours per resident day; facilities reporting less than
0.5 total hours per resident day; and facilities reporting zero residents. The final
analysis file contained 60,283 surveys from 18,134 facilities, approximately half
dated before the implementation of PPS and half after. Each facility had between
one and five (average 3.3) observations during the five-year period.
County-level demographic and socioeconomic information were
obtained from the Bureau of Health Professions’ Area Resource File 2000
(ARF). In addition, 1997Medicare Cost Report data were used to supplement
OSCAR measures of the percent Medicare in each facility.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are staffing ratios and regulatory deficiencies.
Staffing ratios are defined as the number of staff (RN, LPN [licensed practical
nurse], nurse aide) hours worked per resident-day, derived from OSCAR
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variables. The number of regulatory deficiencies is defined as an unweighted
count of health deficiencies recorded in OSCAR. Our design controls for
subjective measurement of deficiencies by isolating effects of the PPS and the
BBRA from the underlying survey trends and allowing for baseline differences
from state to state. A description of all variables in the analysis, including
dependent and explanatory variables, can be found in Table 1.
Key Explanatory Variables
Three explanatory variables are of primary interest: PPS, BBRA, and percent
Medicare. The PPS variable is a scaled indicator (0, .25, .50, .75, or 1) of the
phase of PPS applicable to each facility during the relevant time period. For
example, a facility subject to PPS rates starting on July 1, 1998, would have a
PPS value of zero for all prior MDS quarters, a value of .25 for July 1998–June
1999, and a value of .50 for July 1999–June 2000. Facilities new to Medicare
after 1995, and therefore without 1999 cost reports, were not allowed a
staggered entry andwere coded as PPS5 1 for all surveys after the appropriate
fiscal year start date. Scaling this variable reflects the assumption that any
financial incentive should grow in proportion to the percentage of Medicare
payment that is prospective and not based on facility-specific costs. Since there
was no phase-in for BBRA rate adjustments, the BBRA variable is defined as a
binary variable equal to one on or after April 1, 2000, and zero otherwise.
Percent Medicare is defined as the percent of total residents in a facility
whose primary payer is Medicare, based on pre-PPS calculations, and
categorized into five levels. Alternative constructions of the variable are tested
in a sensitivity analysis. Categories were tested for homogeneity within groups
and heterogeneity of effects across groups; the final categories used in the
analysis were defined as 0 percent Medicare (reference category), 0–6 percent
Medicare, 6–12 percent Medicare, 12–25 percent Medicare, and more than 25
percent Medicare. Since OSCAR measures of percent Medicare were found to
be somewhat unstable, the proportion of resident-days (TotalMedicare Inpatient
Days [S39] as a percentage of Total Inpatient Days [S45]) from 1997 Medicare
Cost Reports was used instead. For those facilities without 1997 Medicare Cost
Reports, an average of baseline (pre-PPS) OSCAR values was used.
Control Variables
Other explanatory variables include state fixed effects (50 dummy variables)
and time fixed effects (4 year dummy variables) to account for state policies
and underlying time trends in staffing, or deficiencies that are unrelated to
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Variables in the Analyses of Nursing Facility
Staffing and Deficiencies
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Dependent Variables (N5 60,283)
RN hours per resident-day 0.52 0.72
Professional staffing (RN1LPN) hours per resident-day 1.24 1.02
Nurse-aide hours per resident-day 2.08 0.76
Number of deficiencies per survey 5.43 5.65
Policy Variables (N560,283)
PPS (5 0, .25, .5, .75 corresponding to phase of PPS rates) 0.19 0.22
BBRA (51 on or after April 1, 2000) 0.17 0.38
Time Trend (N560,283)
Year 1996/97 (reference category) 0.31 0.46
Year 1998 (yes51) 0.23 0.42
Year 1999 (yes51) 0.23 0.42
Year 2000 (yes51) 0.23 0.42
Baseline Facility Characteristics (N518,134)
Zero Medicare (reference category; no Medicare residents) 0.20 0.40
Very Low Medicare (more than 0% but less than or equal to 6%) 0.28 0.45
Low Medicare (more than 6% but less than or equal to 12%) 0.30 0.46
Medium Medicare (more than 12% but less than or equal to 25%) 0.12 0.33
High Medicare (more than 25% Medicare residents) 0.10 0.30
Nonprofit facility (reference category) 0.28 0.45
For-profit facility (yes51) 0.66 0.47
Government facility (yes51) 0.06 0.24
Chain facility (yes5 1) 0.53 0.50
Hospital-based facility (yes5 1) 0.13 0.38
Total number of beds 106.77 74.80
Percent private-pay (payer other than Medicare or Medicaid) 25.02 21.64
Facility offers ventilator care (yes51) 0.02 0.14
Facility offers physical therapy (yes51) 0.97 0.11
Facility offers occupational therapy (yes5 1) 0.95 0.21
ADL index (range 3–21) 10.18 1.59
Skilled services index (range 0–4.4) 0.20 0.27
Percent of residents depressed 0.25 0.18
Percent of residents with psychiatric diagnosis 0.12 0.14
Percent of residents with dementia 0.42 0.20
Baseline County Characteristics (N5 2,912)
High-competition county (HHIo0.12) 0.08 0.27
Low-competition county (HHI40.5) 0.49 0.50
High-demand county (county occupancy rate40.95) 0.25 0.44
Low-demand county (county occupancy rateo0.83) 0.36 0.48
Percent of people in poverty 14.66 7.11
Population (1,000) per square mile 0.22 1.48
Median household income ($1,000s) 33.45 8.30
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PPS; facility characteristics such as ownership, size, level of care, and resident
case mix; and county economic and demographic factors such as the level of
competition and demand for nursing home beds, income, and population
density. The late 1996–1997 cycle of surveys serves as the reference category
for the year variables.
Ownership characteristics (for-profit, government, chain, hospital-
based) may reflect different objectives, resources, and management perspec-
tives. Each characteristic is represented by an indicator variable in the
analysis, with nonprofit, independent, freestanding facilities serving as
reference categories. The number of beds in the facility is defined
continuously and controls for differences in staffing and deficiencies that
can be attributed to size or economies of scale. The percent of residents that
are private-pay serves as a proxy for non-Medicare resources in the facility,
since private-pay residents generally bring in higher profit margins than
Medicaid residents. Finally, the level of care available in the facility and the
resident casemix inevitably affect the need for staffing and risk of deficiencies.
Thus, the outcomes of interest are risk-adjusted through the inclusion of a
measure of average functional dependence (activities of daily living [ADL]
index); indicators of whether ventilator care, physical therapy, and occupa-
tional therapy are available; a measure of other skilled services provided
(skilled services index); and percents of residents with depression, psychiatric
diagnoses, and dementia. The ADL index is constructed as an average of the
percent of residents who are bedfast or chairbound or need assistance with
eating, toileting, and transferring, weighted by the amount of assistance
needed; although the ADL measures available in OSCAR are at the facility
level, the formula used for the index gives an approximate equivalent to the
RUG-III ADL index at the resident level (Cowles Research Group 1996). The
skilled services index is a sum of the percentages of residents utilizing
intravenous therapy, suctioning, respiratory therapy, tracheostomy care, and
parenteral feeding.
County economic and demographic factors may affect demand for a
facility’s services as well as the facility’s ability to attract and retain staff. If
facilities compete on the basis of quality, facilities in more competitive areas
may maintain higher quality than those in low-competition areas. Competi-
tion among nursing homes is measured by a standard Herfindahl index,
defined as sum of the squared market shares of all homes in a county. We
define a high-competition county by a Herfindahl less than .12, and a low-
competition county by a score greater than .5. By similar reasoning, facilities in
areas with high demand for nursing home beds have little problem filling beds
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and may therefore maintain lower quality than facilities in low-demand areas.
Demand is measured by the county occupancy rate for nursing home beds,
with high demand defined as occupancy greater than 95 percent and low
demand as occupancy less than 83 percent. We chose cut-points for the
competition and demand variables by examining the distribution of the
variables and looking for natural breaks or thresholds. County-level nursing
facility occupancy rates also serve as proxies for competitive forces in the
market, such as the availability of other nursing homes, home health services,
and assisted living facilities. Thesemeasures are supplementedwith additional
factors that may affect demand. Counties with higher median incomes, or
lower poverty levels, would be expected to have higher demand for nursing
facility care at any given level of quality. Finally, more densely populated areas
have more potential nursing home residents and should be associated with
higher demand.
Endogeneity
An important methodological concern is that the percent Medicare, an
important identifying variable, is potentially endogenous. The percent
Medicare could be a function of quality and staffing (reverse causality).
Facilities with higher quality may attract a higher percent Medicare.
Furthermore, the percent Medicare could be a function of the PPS and the
BBRA, allowing the bias to spread to the supposedly independent policy
variables of interest. For example, if facilities decrease their percent Medicare
in response to the PPS, theymight exhibit lower staffing and lower deficiencies
that do not represent changes in quality but rather changes in case mix. Not
dealing with the potential endogeneity of the percent Medicare would not
only bias the coefficients on the percent Medicare, but also on the policy
variables. To solve both problems, only a baseline, time-invariant measure of
percentMedicare is used. The baselinemeasure is not affected by either future
policy changes or contemporaneous changes in quality and staffing. The
percent Medicare thereby represents the exposure of a facility to potential
Medicare policy changes before they take effect.
One additional source of endogeneity may still persist. Despite using a
time-invariant measure, the baseline percent Medicare may be a function of
past quality and staffing, which is related to current quality and staffing.
However, because the focus of the model is on measuring the effect of policy
changes on staffing, any remaining bias to the policy coefficients after using the
baseline percent Medicare is likely to be small.
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Estimation Procedure
Following a standard difference-in-differences specification, the PPS variable
represents the time trend, the percent Medicare variable represents the
treatment, and the interaction term between the two represents the differential
effect of interest. Staffing and deficiencies are modeled as functions of PPS,
BBRA, percent Medicare, interactions between PPS/BBRA and percent
Medicare, and facility- and county-level control variables (ownership,
resources, case mix, competition, demand). Because potential correlation
exists among facilities within a state, the model is estimated using state-level
fixed effects. The state fixed effects control for baseline differences in staffing
or deficiencies due to state regulatory, fiscal, economic, or other factors. Time
fixed effects account for underlying time trends unrelated to the policies of
interest. The basic model for facility f at time t has the following form, using
the staffing equation as an example:
StaffingRatio ¼ b0þb1PPSft þb2BBRAt þb3%Medicaref þb4PPSft x%Medicaref
þ b5BBRAt x%Medicaref þ b6Controlsft þ b7StateFixedEffectsf
þ b8TimeFixedEffectst þ eft
where t ranges from 1 to 5 depending on the number of surveys the facility had
during the study period. The same equation applies in the analysis of
deficiencies with a change in the dependent variable. In all cases, robust
standard errors are used to account for correlation among observations from
the same facility over time.
The base model contains interactions only between the policy variables
and the percent Medicare. To assess differential effects of the policies on
certain types of facilities such as for-profit, chain, and hospital-based facilities,
an additional set of interactions is included. For example, the triple interaction
of the for-profit indicator, PPS, and percentMedicare gives the effect of PPS on
for-profits over and above the effect on nonprofit and government facilities.
We estimated an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to predict the
facility staffing ratio, which is continuous. Analysis of the number of
deficiencies, a count variable, requires a different approach. Negative
binomial regression is used in the deficiency analysis because OLS could
result in biased coefficients with count data. All analyses are conducted using
STATA 7.0 (2001).
We test four main hypotheses: that staffing decreased in response to PPS
and increased in response to BBRA, and that deficiencies increased in
response to PPS and decreased in response to BBRA.We test both by looking
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at the interaction terms between the policy variables and the percent
Medicare, which give the policy effects over and above the trends in non-
Medicare facilities. If the staffing hypotheses are correct, we would expect to
see negative coefficients on the interactions between PPS and percent
Medicare and positive coefficients on the interactions between BBRA and
percent Medicare. Since regulatory deficiencies are a negative measure of
quality, we would expect the PPS interactions to be positive and the BBRA
interactions to be negative. Furthermore, we would expect the magnitudes of
each to be increasing with the percent Medicare in all cases.
RESULTS
The PPS has the strongest negative effect on the sum of RN and LPN hours, a
measure of professional staffing (see Table 2). The PPS interactions are
negative, significant, and strictly increasing in magnitude with the percent
Medicare. The BBRA effects are positive and mostly significant, but the
magnitudes do not increase with the percent Medicare. The RN regression
shows similar results to the RN1LPN regression except that coefficients at the
highest levels ofMedicare are less significant and do not conform to the pattern
of increasing magnitudes, even changing sign in the case of BBRA effects. The
nurse-aide regression shows no significant policy effects from PPS or BBRA.
The magnitudes of the professional staffing results are substantial. Given
a mean ratio of 1.2 professional hours per resident day, marginal effects of
.2–.4 hours translate roughly to a 17–33 percent reduction attributed to PPS.
For the BBRA results, the magnitudes of effects are smaller, increases of
.05–.08 hours, or a 4–7 percent increase on average.
Focusing on the professional staffing regression, themain effect and time
trend results indicate an underlying trend toward more professional staffing
during the time of PPS and a somewhat weaker decrease during the time of
BBRA. The policy effects described above are net of these trends. As
expected, facilities with higher percent Medicare at baseline started with
higher staffing levels. For-profit facilities exhibited lower staffing at baseline
than nonprofits, while hospital-based facilities exhibited higher staffing than
freestanding facilities. Chain facilities started with lower nurse-aide staffing
ratios than freestanding facilities. Other control variables provided results that
were largely as expected.
In the negative binomial regression on total number of regulatory
deficiencies, the policy effects of PPS are positive, with two out of the four
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Table 2: Effects of PPS and BBRA on Staffing Hours per Resident-Day
(N5 60,283)
Variable RN Hours RN1LPN Hours Nurse-Aide Hours
Constant 0.393nnn 1.100nnn 1.632nnn
(0.047) (0.065) (0.070)
Policy Effects
PPS  Very Low Medicare  0.159nnn  0.254nnn  0.016
(0.027) (0.046) (0.049)
PPS  Low Medicare  0.160nnn  0.259nnn  0.031
(0.027) (0.046) (0.049)
PPS  Medium Medicare  0.195nnn  0.266nnn  0.032
(0.032) (0.052) (0.058)
PPS  High Medicare  0.122n  0.400nnn  0.086
(0.062) (0.080) (0.072)
BBRA  Very Low Medicare 0.046nnn 0.080nnn  0.012
(0.016) (0.028) (0.030)
BBRA  Low Medicare 0.037nn 0.064nn  0.012
(0.015) (0.028) (0.030)
BBRA  Medium Medicare 0.043nn 0.069nn  0.031
(0.018) (0.031) (0.037)
BBRA  High Medicare  0.053 0.051  0.101nn
(0.049) (0.065) (0.051)
Main Effects/Time Trends
PPS 0.170nnn 0.247nnn 0.031
(0.031) (0.050) (0.052)
BBRA  0.032nn  0.041 0.060nn
(0.015) (0.027) (0.028)
Very Low Medicare 0.0363nnn 0.033nnn 0.001
(0.0087) (0.013) (0.015)
Low Medicare 0.0610nnn 0.078nnn  0.001
(0.0097) (0.014) (0.017)
Medium Medicare 0.125nnn 0.163nnn 0.032
(0.013) (0.018) (0.021)
High Medicare 1.242nnn 1.698nnn 0.277nnn
(0.036) (0.045) (0.035)
Year 1998  0.0051 0.0026  0.0102
(0.0044) (0.0063) (0.0066)
Year 1999  0.0157nn 0.025nnn 0.007
(0.0071) (0.010) (0.011)
Year 2000  0.057nnn  0.030nn  0.025
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
Facility Characteristics
For-profit facility  0.0653nnn  0.096nnn  0.212nnn
(0.0080) (0.011) (0.012)
Government facility  0.052nnn  0.012 0.106nnn
(0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
Chain facility  0.0089  0.0116  0.0833nnn
continued
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Table 2. Continued
Variable RN Hours RN1LPN Hours Nurse-Aide Hours
(0.0063) (0.0083) (0.0093)
Hospital-based facility 0.391nnn 0.550nnn 0.039n
(0.021) (0.027) (0.022)
Total number of beds  0.00034nnn  0.00048nnn  0.00018nn
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00008)
Percent private-pay 0.00080nnn 0.00106nnn 0.00219nnn
(0.00020) (0.00029) (0.00029)
Facility offers ventilator care  0.023  0.041  0.042
(0.026) (0.032) (0.031)
Facility offers physical therapy  0.022  0.066n 0.052
(0.022) (0.036) (0.040)
Facility offers occupational therapy 0.031nn 0.033 0.024
(0.015) (0.022) (0.022)
ADL index  0.0217nnn  0.0152nnn 0.0481nnn
(0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Skilled services index 0.358nnn 0.801nnn 0.168nnn
(0.028) (0.034) (0.030)
Percent depressed  0.034nn  0.066nnn 0.024
(0.014) (0.019) (0.020)
Percent with psychiatric diagnosis  0.185nnn  0.178nnn  0.191nnn
(0.017) (0.024) (0.028)
Percent with dementia  0.210nnn  0.227nnn 0.059nn
(0.016) (0.023) (0.026)
County Characteristics
High-competition county 0.0305nnn 0.0238nn 0.016
(0.0074) (0.0098) (0.011)
Low-competition county  0.0117  0.078nnn 0.004
(0.0083) (0.012) (0.012)
High-demand county  0.0174nnn  0.0358nnn  0.0179n
(0.0061) (0.0085) (0.0093)
Low-demand county 0.0371nnn 0.0860nnn 0.0501nnn
(0.0062) (0.0083) (0.0093)
Percent of people in poverty  0.00132  0.0060nnn 0.0014
(0.00082) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Population (1,000) per square mile 0.00652nnn  0.0009  0.0028nn
(0.00092) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Median household income ($1,000s) 0.00483nnn 0.00150nn 0.00051
(0.00047) (0.00060) (0.00067)
R-squared 0.58 0.59 0.15
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being statistically significant (see Table 3). Policy effects of BBRA show
consistently negative coefficients, though only one effect is significant. In both
cases, magnitudes of the effects increase with the percent Medicare up to the
final category. Main effect and time trend variables show that high Medicare
facilities differed significantly in baseline numbers of deficiencies from other
facilities, and that there appeared to be a general trend toward increasing
deficiencies during the course of the study period. Again, other control
variables gave expected results.
Magnitudes of the policy effects of PPS and BBRA on the number of
deficiencies cannot be read directly from the negative binomial regression
results but were calculated from them. Average predicted values of the
dependent variable were calculated with and without the policy effects and
subtracted to get estimated marginal effects. Non-Medicare facilities experi-
enced a decline in deficiencies during the time of PPS, while facilities with
Medicare experienced an increase; the marginal effect of PPS is therefore
defined as the difference between the two changes. The estimated marginal
effect of PPS after the full phase-in is an increase in deficiencies of .64 per
survey, or about a 12 percent increase over the mean number of deficiencies
(5.4). Under BBRA, the opposite was true: non-Medicare facilities experi-
enced an increase in deficiencies, while facilities withMedicare experienced a
decrease. The estimated marginal effect that we can attribute to BBRA is a
decrease in deficiencies of .18 per survey, or about a 3 percent decrease.
Finally, Table 4 shows the results of the analysis of differential effects on
for-profit, chain, and hospital-based facilities. In each case, the entire sample is
used in the analysis, and triple interaction terms give the policy effects of
interest; only these effects are shown. Differential effects on a type of facility
would be evidenced by a pattern of consistent signs and significant
coefficients. No strong pattern is found for any of the three groups, though
some indication of potential differences exists. For-profit facilities at the
highest levels ofMedicare exhibit larger changes in staffing than do nonprofits.
Chain facilities exhibit consistently larger decreases in staffing under PPS and
also larger increases under BBRA than independent facilities, but the
differences are statistically significant only at the lowest levels of Medicare.
Hospital-based facilities appear to exhibit slightly larger changes than
freestanding facilities, as expected.
Sensitivity analyses show that the main results are robust to changes in
the construction of the PPS and percent Medicare variables. Similar changes
in staffing and deficiencies are evident if a continuous measure of percent
Medicare is used, or if smaller or larger categories are defined. If percent
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Table 3: Negative Binomial Estimation of Effects of PPS and BBRA on
Regulatory Deficiencies (N5 60,283)




PPS  Very Low Medicare 0.083
(0.071)
PPS  Low Medicare 0.126n
(0.072)
PPS  Medium Medicare 0.258nnn
(0.083)
PPS  High Medicare 0.054
(0.086)
BBRA  Very Low Medicare  0.004
(0.041)
BBRA  Low Medicare  0.036
(0.040)
BBRA  Medium Medicare  0.117n
(0.047)
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Table 3. Continued
Variable Estimated Effect on Number of Deficiencies
(0.011)
Hospital-based facility  0.068nnn
(0.023)
Total number of beds 0.00181nnn
(0.00010)
Percent private-pay  0.00467nnn
(0.00029)
Facility offers ventilator care 0.111nnn
(0.034)
Facility offers physical therapy 0.060
(0.049)




Skilled services index  0.171nnn
(0.024)
Percent of residents depressed  0.177nnn
(0.026)
Percent of residents with psychiatric diagnosis 0.148nnn
(0.034)





Low-competition county  0.049nnn
(0.016)




Percent of people in poverty 0.0013
(0.0015)
Population (1,000) per square mile  0.0343nnn
(0.0031)
Median household income ($1,000s)  0.00146n
(0.00084)
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Medicare is allowed to vary over time, results appear to be stronger, but the
use of a baseline measure is preferred in order to avoid endogeneity bias.
Changes in the construction of the PPS variable can lead to different
magnitudes of effects but do not change the general pattern and significance.
DISCUSSION
The hypotheses in this analysis——that the prospective payment system and
associated Medicare rate cuts would potentially decrease quality of care and
that the rate increases under BBRA would potentially increase quality of
care——are supported by these results. The results for the PPS interactions
suggest that professional staffing has suffered due to the implementation of
PPS and the associated rate cuts. Results for the BBRA interactions show
Table 4: Differential Effects of PPS and BBRA on Professional Staffing by








PPS  Very Low Medicare 0.132  0.113  0.35n
(0.094) (0.095) (0.20)
PPS  Low Medicare 0.083  0.093  0.64nnn
(0.96) (0.096) (0.21)
PPS  Medium Medicare  0.16  0.30nnn  0.24
(0.11) (0.11) (0.26)
PPS  High Medicare  1.00nnn  0.19  0.46n
(0.25) (0.22) (0.25)
BBRA  Very Low Medicare  0.067 0.069 0.09
(0.057) (0.058) (0.14)
BBRA  Low Medicare  0.060 0.079 0.31nn
(0.058) (0.058) (0.15)
BBRA  Medium Medicare  0.030 0.131n 0.13
(0.072) (0.069) (0.15)
BBRA  High Medicare 0.35nn 0.08 0.51nnn
(0.16) (0.14) (0.17)
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evidence of an improvement in professional staffing with the BBRA rate
increases, though not as compelling as the evidence for decreases with PPS.
There are several reasons why the BBRA results might be weaker. First, the
funding increase under BBRA was smaller than the funding decrease under
PPS, so a smaller effect would be expected. Second, the BBRA rate increases
were designed to be temporary. Facility behavior under uncertainty may be
expected to be weaker, as theymay be hesitant to make permanent changes in
staffing. Finally, the BBRA was implemented in April of the final year of this
analysis, resulting in a short window of only nine months in which we could
observe an effect.
The analysis of regulatory deficiencies provides weak evidence that the
staffing changes translated into changes in quality as measured by regulatory
compliance. Signs of effects were generally as expected, but statistical
significance and the pattern ofmagnitudeswere not compelling. One potential
reason for the lack of strong results is that deficiencies may be too inexact a
proxy for real changes in quality; an analysis of relevant outcomes at a resident
level would be necessary to make firmer conclusions about the effects of
Medicare rate changes on residents. Nonetheless, the deficiency results
weakly support and do not contradict findings from the staffing results that PPS
led to decreased quality and BBRA led to increased quality.
The staffing findings appear to be fairly consistent across types of
facilities. No strong pattern of differential effects was found between for-profits
and nonprofits or chain and independent facilities, though the results are not
conclusive. There is somewhat stronger evidence that hospital-based facilities
reacted more strongly than freestanding facilities. These differences are not
very robust to changes in specification and definition of the PPS variable,
perhaps due to the relatively rare types of facilities included in some of the
categories. We can interpret these results as preliminary evidence that
hospital-based facilities may have been affected to a greater extent by PPS and
BBRA, consistent with expectations but in need of further research.
The study presents some limitations. First, the percent Medicare
residents is a reasonable but imperfect proxy for the exposure of a facility to
Medicare policy changes. Second, staffing levels are reported with errors in
OSCAR and represent staffing only in the two-week period directly preceding
a recertification survey, with variability between surveys unknown. We
control for this problem to some extent by removing those facilities with
outliers. Third, under the BBRA, facilities were allowed tomove directly to the
full federal rate in 2000 if they wished. It is not known which facilities, or even
how many, chose to take that option, resulting in some measurement error in
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the scaled PPS variable. If we assume in a sensitivity analysis that all facilities
take the option, results become stronger inmagnitude and significance; we are
therefore probably underestimating the effects of PPS and BBRA due to the
missing information. Another limitation is the use of facility-level data, which
allow for the analysis of staffing but are weak for the purpose of examining
resident-level outcomes. Further research at a resident level could provide
more insight into the effects of Medicare rate changes on outcomes of care.
The policy implications of these findings are straightforward. In a
nursing home industry that is competitive but relies largely on public funds,
payment rates need to be high enough to support a desired level of quality of
care, and cost-containment measures must be viewed in terms of the tradeoff
with quality. Based on a study of 10 states, CMS recently concluded that 23–56
percent of nursing facilities fail to provide minimum levels of professional
staffing below which quality of care may be seriously impaired (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services 2001). In this context, cost-containment
strategies that result in lower staffing levels may not be worth the tradeoff.
Furthermore, Medicare rates cannot be viewed in terms of the effect on
Medicare residents only, as effects may be experienced throughout the facility
on all types of residents. Because staffing is responsible for the majority of a
facility’s operating expenses, staffing is likely to be a primary target for cost
containment when funding decreases, and staffing ratios affect Medicaid and
private-pay residents as well as Medicare residents. A long-term view of
quality must look at the entire spectrum of residents and services within the
nursing facility.
The policy debate about skilled nursing facility PPS will continue for
some time. The evidence presented here suggests that PPS and changes in
Medicare rates have a potentially important effect on outcomes of care in
nursing homes through the effect on professional staffing. These results could
be used to inform the continuing policy debate on adjustments to the SNF PPS
system and to anticipate nursing facility behavior in response to future changes.
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